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This paper compares two contrary, yet not altogether uncomplimentary appropriations of 
Augustine’s reading of history: one  by Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, the other by Eric Voegelin. 
Through a personal journey, involving the deep friendship and inspiring dialogical provocations 
of Eric Voegelin’s long time friend, student and personal assistant, Paul Caringella, I have 
returned to a pair I first addressed in print some fifteen years ago (Cristaudo: 1999). This paper, 
while not contradicting the earlier work, explores different aspects of their work and generally 
adopts a more conciliatory approach to these two marginal thinkers who have left behind 
astonishing works of power and profundity.  
Both were émigrés from Hitler deeply conscious of the historicity of the twentieth 
century and attending to the subterranean currents that had led the Western world into the 
catastrophes that had dominated that century. Neither had the luxury of being able to wrap their 
insights up with the Marxian paradigm, which would have given them a greater ready-made 
social theoretical audience. Voegelin has often been classified, somewhat simplistically as a 
conservative; though in Germany his students were frequently social democrats in their political 
persuasion, and in North America today his academic progeny are as likely to be Democrats as 
Republicans. Rosenstock-Huessy is even more difficult to define politically, even if his 
insistence upon the importance of the family and the importance of religion within community  
leads him to have certain affinities with cultural conservatives, he is also (much more so than 
Voegelin) much more positive in his appraisals of Marx and Nietzschean (whom he tends to treat 
as brothers in arms addressing different dimensions of the problems of modernity [e.g. 
Rosenstock-Huessy, 1998 [1926/27], Vol. 1, 57-62, ]), happy to dedicate a work to the 
revolutionaries (Rosenstock-Huessy,  1969, ch. 2, 16-25) for their courage in exploding worlds 
unworthy of survival.    
Both men were also deeply sensitive to the importance of the symbolic and linguistic 
stock of the religious experiences of the West   And they shared a deep conviction that modern 
men and women are spiritually in the greatest danger, from widespread social atomization, 
disintegration and mechanization. Perhaps that is the one fundamental feature that united all 
Austro-German intellectuals whose thought was formed in the penumbra of the World Wars, 
irrespective of where or how they positioned themselves ideologically toward the future. The 
faith of a liberal progressive like John Dewey—scorned publicly by Rosenstock-Huessy in The 
Christian Faith (Rosenstock-Huessy, 1966, 42 ff., and dismissed privately by Voegelin, who 
commented in a letter to Francis Wilson (November 19, 1957) that Dewey was simply not 
worthy of philosophical refutation (Voegelin 2007, 323-324), was, for the most part, impossible. 
Europe had invested immense hope and faith in science, liberty, and progress, and when they had 
failed to stave off the Great War, they found few philosophical champions on European soil. 
Unlike their Austrian and German contemporaries, who frequently found themselves attracted to 
the ideologies of Marxism and National Socialism (among them was a close friend and coauthor 
of Rosenstock-Huessy’s, Werner Picht, as well as his more famous Berlin colleague and 
acquaintance, Carl Schmitt), neither Rosenstock-Huessy nor Voegelin were in the least attracted 
to these ideologies. If Voegelin presented Marxism, National Socialism, and progressive 
liberalism as part of a common Gnostic delusion, variant components of modernity’s spiritual 
deformation, Rosenstock-Huessy was just as convinced that they were all false idols. Both also 
believed that the most important truths regarding humanity’s health had been expressed by 
Christianity. But whereas Voegelin could speak of the need to ‘restore’, as he put it in ‘The 
Gospel and Culture’, ‘the rule of reason’ (Voegelin, 1990, 212),  Rosenstock-Huessy held that 
our experiences of speech, history, and time give us far more orientation (or, if one will, names 
for reasoning with) than reason itself.  
  Likewise, whereas Voegelin devotes a great deal of time and energy to a painstaking 
reading and defense of classical reason, and draws heavily upon classical philosophy to view 
what he calls our modern spiritual ‘derailment,’ Rosenstock-Huessy could barely bring himself 
to speak of philosophy and theology without expressing disapproval in what he saw as the 
exaggeration of faith in the powers of the mind. Yet Voegelin’s very love of classical reason as 
exhibited particularly by Plato is in large part due to what he sees as its inherent understanding of 
human limits and, thus also, the limits of the mind’s grasp of reality. But this stress upon limits 
of reason, which he sees as integral to its proper deployment, only partially brings him and 
Rosenstock-Huessy into concord. For Rosenstock-Huessy—somewhat akin to Hayek’s distrust 
of the overreliance on order understood as taxis, as opposed to the spontaneously induced order 
of catallaxy—one of the problems of classical reasoning is precisely that it is incapable of 
adequately drawing our limits. This is not because of any Gnostic faith on his part—indeed, he 
says that ‘[w]e can overcome the new hordes who make vitality their god only with a sword 
whose steel contains no alloy of Humanism or Gnostics’ (Rosenstock-Huessy, 1966, 122) - but 
because of his faith in God’s incalculable majesty. Being open to God’s love means being a self 
that is open to the light of grace, and, through grace, what may be impossible one day might be 
possible at another time. And, for Rosenstock-Huessy, our temporal nature was always properly 
represented by Christianity. Thus he says that  
 
the very essence of Christianity is historical—it is the story of man’s salvation—
so to be a Christian is to think primarily in the language of time rather than of 
space, as shown by the favorite biblical phrase, ‘the world to come’. Christianity 
created true future, as we have seen. Christian other-worldliness actually consists 
of ‘the powers of the world to come’ (Heb. 6:5) breaking in upon the world as it 
has already come to be (Rosenstock-Huessy, 1966, 123).  
 
It is in keeping with this emphasis upon Christianity as a process of God not only revealing 
Himself through time, but in humanity becoming conscious of his God-given powers over time, 
that Rosenstock-Huessy came into conflict with Karl Barth. He had been excited by the 
publication of Barth’s Letter to the Romans, only to realize, on closer inspection, that it omitted 
what he thought was this temporal dimension that he viewed as so essential to Christianity. 
When challenged by Rosenstock-Huessy’s somewhat blunt criticisms, Barth responded by 
referring to 1 Corinthians 15, asking Rosenstock-Huessy whether the ‘transcendent’ powers 
belonging to God are meant for humanity. For his part, Rosenstock-Huessy retorted:  
 
Hasn’t salvation come into the world? Hasn’t God taken pity on us? Does Paul 
speak of the transcendent powers of new eon or of a Father who lives up there 50 
million kilometers away or does he speak of the Son of God who became man. 
Christ became flesh, thus we live in his name which is the addressable and effable 
name of God. Thus has God revealed himself. Where’s the transcendence in this 
(Rosenstock-Huessy, 1919)? 
 
 Voegelin’s emphasis, on the other hand, is upon the human search for order and, indeed, 
he is emphatic about that order being anchored in an opening to the transcendent. Thus we find 
the following passage from the third volume of his magnum opus Order and History, which is as 
much a description of Voegelin’s own account of man and history as a description of its classical 
‘account’: 
 
The field of this history is the soul of man. Man, in his knowledge of himself, 
does not know himself only as a world-immanent existent but also as existing in 
openness toward transcendental reality; but he knows himself in this openness 
only historically in the degree of differentiation that his experiences and their 
symbolization have reached. The self-understanding of man is conditioned and 
limited by the development of his existence toward transcendence. As a 
consequence, the nature of man itself as an object of metaphysical inquiry is not 
altogether a world-immanent object; the formation of the soul through invading 
transcendence is part of that ‘nature’ that we explore in metaphysics. When the 
philosopher explores the spiritual order of the soul, he explores a realm of 
experiences that he can appropriately describe only in the language of symbols 
expressing the movement of the soul toward transcendental reality and the 
flooding of the soul by transcendence. At the border of transcendence the 
language of philosophical anthropology must become the language of religious 
symbolization (Voegelin, 1957, 363)  
 
 In this respect, and allowing for their respective disagreements about the adequacy of 
what Voegelin calls the symbol of transcendence, Rosenstock-Huessy and Voegelin are at one in 
their insistence upon the importance of humanity’s openness to God’s grace. Where they do 
differ, though, is that in Voegelin that openness seems to be largely of an intellectual nature; 
even Voegelin’s choice of symbols, as opposed to Rosenstock-Huessy preference for names, 
suggests that the participation Voegelin is primarily talking about is one of questioning and 
reflecting. Of course, Voegelin’s reading of transcendence is, as the above passage also 
indicates, intrinsically connected to history, and his alliance with Christianity is due to what he 
sees as the symbolic potency of the Christian grasp of man in history. It is precisely humanity’s 
temporality that Voegelin stresses against the Gnostic stormers of heaven. Thus the very opening 
sentence of his minor classic The New Science of Politics: ‘The existence of man in political 
science is historical existence; and a theory of politics, if it penetrates to principles, must at the 
same time be a theory of history (Voegelin, 1952, 1). But for him, that temporality means that we 
must recognize where we fall short, and it is this failure to understand our limits that is behind 
what Voegelin refers to by such terms as ‘the magic dream’, ‘spiritual derailment’, and the 
‘spiritual disease’ of the Gnostic ‘metastatic faith’ which he sees as defining modernity. That 
Gnostic metastatic faith is an ideological faith. And modern ideologies are, as he realized as a 
young man, political religions, religions which all do away with the need for the genuine and 
loving God of creation and salvation. And, while retaining the core symbols of religion, they 
trade in the limited horizon of a temporality severed from its transcendent telos of the eschaton. 
A symbol that is essential to humanity’s spiritual health is deformed and defaced through the 
substitution of the pseudo-telos of historical immanence, and thus what we have is a non-reality, 
or butchered reality, posing as the ultimate reality. Thus political religions are like a virus 
infecting men and women so that they lose faith in their participation in the divine ground, and 
put their faith in monstrously bloody schemes of violence. 
 Thus, to counter the mentality behind political religions or ideologies, Voegelin chooses 
as his epigraph to the five volumes of his magnum opus, Order and History a sentence from 
Augustine’s De Vera Religione: ‘In the study of creature one should not exercise a vain and 
perishing curiosity, but ascend toward what is immortal and everlasting’. And in Order and 
History, and again in contrast to the ideologies, Voegelin is presenting the great symbols of that 
ascent. Order and History is, as I am suggesting, written as a reaction to the false or delusional 
symbolic clusters of ideology, which is  
existence in rebellion against God and man. It is the violation of the First and 
Tenth Commandments, if we want to use the language of Israelite order; it is the 
nosos, the disease of the spirit, if we want to use the language of Aeschylus and 
Plato Voegelin, 1956, xiv).  
 
Thus Voegelin’s primary theoretical concern was with modern men and women’s ‘spiritual 
derailment’, their tumult that comes from their failure to comprehend that ‘God and man, world 
and society form a primordial community of being’ (Voegelin, 1956, 1).  
This failure, which for Voegelin is allied to the spread of the totalitarian ideologies of the 
twentieth century and the enlightenment faith which bred these monsters of excessive hope and 
stupidity, stands in the closest to relationship to how he sees both history and his role as a 
political philosopher. Thus again from the Preface to the first volume of Order and History: 
 
The Logos of being is the object proper of philosophical inquiry; and the search 
for truth concerning the order of being cannot be conducted without diagnosing 
the modes of existence in untruth. The truth of order has to be gained and 
regained in the perpetual struggle against the fall from it; and the movement 
toward truth starts from a man’s awareness of his existence in untruth. The 
diagnostic and therapeutic functions are inseparable in philosophy as a form of 
existence. And ever since Plato, in the disorder of his time, discovered the 
connection, philosophical inquiry has been one of the means of establishing 
islands of order in the disorder of the age. (Voegelin, 1956, xiv) 
 
As the quote, illustrates Voegelin sees himself as a diagnostician, and he is diagnosing the 
spiritual disease of his time. As with a doctor, the task is to bring the patient back to health. But, 
if I may continue with this analogy, because a patient has been made healthy does not mean that 
he will stave off all other diseases, including death.  
 What I most want to emphasize in this brief look at Voegelin’s understanding of history 
is his idea of the struggle between order and the fall from it, along with his interest in history as 
an intelligible struggle ‘for true order’ (Voegelin, 1956, ix). Voegelin’s interest in Christianity 
stands in the closest relationship to his belief that this struggle is interminable; and while he 
identified himself primarily a philosopher, he was very aware of the limits of philosophy’s 
efficacy. As Paul Caringella drew to my attention, he addressed this in a personal letter to 
Manfred Henningsen:  
Nothing has come, so to speak, of classical philosophy as a socially ordering 
power; the radical understanding of transcendence has come through Christianity, 
not through the philosophers. For most people, conversion seems to go other ways 
than that of the actualization of the nous, as is shown precisely in the cases of 
Paul and Augustine (Conf. VIII), both of whom certainly had a sound 
philosophical schooling. . . . [A]s Book VIII of the Confessiones demonstrates, a 
very intensive phase of zetesis to the point of despair precedes one’s own 
conversion experience. But this Augustinian zetesis experiences itself as a 
hopeless striving to the point of despair—and precisely because the philosophical 
“solutions” are perceived of as unsatisfactory (Voegelin, 2007, 600). 
 
 Voegelin sees that (Augustinian) Christianity spells out the true nature of the human 
predicament, by simultaneously tending to the need to break beyond the limits of our humanity, 
with all the suffering and injustice it entails, and by providing a Church in which its members 
together may become members of a “heavenly city,” while making eschatological fulfillment 
ever a beyond. The following passage from the New Science of Politics encapsulates what 
Voegelin considers to be his Christian view of society, as well as the anti-Christian view that 
originates in the very bosom of Christianity:  
 
The soteriological truth of Christianity, then, breaks with the rhythm of existence; 
beyond temporal successes and reverses lies the supernatural destiny of man, the 
perfection through grace in the beyond. Man and mankind now have fulfillment, 
but it lies beyond nature. Again there is no eidos of history, because the 
eschatological supernature is not a nature in the philosophical, immanent sense. 
The problem of an eidos in history, hence, arises only when Christian 
transcendental fulfillment becomes immanentized. Such an immanentist 
hypostasis of the eschaton, however, is a theoretical fallacy. Things are not things, 
nor do they have essences, by arbitrary declaration. The course of history as a 
whole is no object of experience; history has no eidos, because the course of 
history extends into the unknown future. The meaning of history, thus, is an 
illusion; and this illusionary eidos is created by treating a symbol of faith as if it 
were a proposition concerning an object of immanent experience (Voegelin, 1952, 
119-20. 
 
 For Voegelin, then, Augustine’s great importance was in his distinction between earthly 
and heavenly cities, and his dismissal of literal millenarianism. Thanks to Augustine, the 
conception of the Church within the structure of history became clarified: ‘The Logos had 
become flesh in Christ; the grace of redemption had been bestowed on man; there would be no 
divinization of society beyond the pneumatic presence of Christ in his church (Voegelin, 1952, 
109). The spiritual and temporal orders had been divided once and for all: ‘In its temporal 
articulation it accepted the conditio humana without chiliastic fancies, while it heightened 
natural existence by the representation of spiritual destiny through the church’ (Voegelin, 1952, 
109).  
 For Voegelin, then, the great disaster for modern men and women has been that the 
greatest hardships of our natural existence which call out for spiritual solutions are multiplied out 
of all proportion by the ideological quick fixes which promise earthly redemption while 
delivering hell on earth. Further, Voegelin argues, that process, which has been taking place over 
a thousand years, gained rapid acceleration with the French Revolution. With that revolution, 
‘the radical wave of gnosticism was so strong that it permanently split the nation into the laicist 
half that based itself on the Revolution and the conservative half that tried, and tries, to salvage 
the Christian tradition’ (Voegelin, 1952, 188). 
  In From Enlightenment to Revolution, John Hallowell’s edition of outtakes from 
Voegelin’s History of Political Ideas—the work Voegelin had turned his back on as he sought a 
more adequate grounding of the problem that gnawed at him his whole life—Voegelin provided 
a powerful analysis of the Enlightenment’s complicity in the totalitarian ideologies of the 
twentieth century. And while he was convinced that behind the Enlightenment lay a far more 
archaic deformed symbolic ‘edifice’, in that work he lays out with compelling clarity the 
historical ‘ideas’ that will do so much damage.  
 He commences with secularized history, in which ‘transcendental universalism 
disintegrates under the impact of profane materials which cannot be related, however tenuously, 
to the course of sacred history, [so that] the universality of meaning has to degenerate into the 
ideal of empirical completeness’ (Voegelin, 1975, 9). This results in the dissolution of 
humankind into a 
mass of pleasure-pain mechanisms and the One who will manipulate the 
mechanisms for the good of society. The nature of man, by a kind of division of 
labor, is distributed among masses and leaders so that only society as a whole is 
integral man. Moreover the operations of the legislator on the members of society 
substitute, as we have seen, for grace and predestination. Society has become a 
totally closed universe with an immanent process of salvation (Voegelin, 1975, 
51. 
 
 For Voegelin, Helvétius is a critical thinker in this process of deformation. Taking 
Pascal’s view of the passions, an endless restlessness with a centre of nothingness which blocks 
out the grace of God, Helvétius devises a theory of social evolution for the happiness of the 
greatest number—and that happiness is to be achieved by the God-like surrogate of the 
legislator. With the accompanying faith in science as the accumulation of positive facts inserted 
into the schema of progress and revolt, Christianity becomes overthrown, but only by having its 
understanding of order mis-appropriated, reconfigured into a pattern that makes revolt central to 
the human essence. With both the French and Russian Revolutions, Voegelin’s concern is 
primarily the political ideas that both fuelled them and that came out of them, and which 
continue to erode the more stable potentials for order that he regards as present in the United 
States and Great Britain—countries whose revolutions were curtailed through the bulwarks of 
their residual Christian institutions. Although both radical revolutions are of fundamental 
importance in terms of his diagnosis of modernity’s sickness, and given the shift from his interest 
in ideas to symbols, and the emphasis upon participation in being accompanying his 
interpretation of the importance of symbols in man’s sense of order, Voegelin actually has very 
little to say about these revolutions as revolutions, especially about the more—to use a Marxist 
term which is not inappropriate here—‘material’ causes, the historical socio-economic forces, as 
opposed to the ideas, behind the revolutions.  
 Ultimately the value of Voegelin’s work is his diagnosis of false hopes and delusions, 
and the insight he brings into why the Christian and classical traditions should not simply be 
dispensed with in favour of the modern political religions and their symbols. In particular, it is 
his sense of the importance of the relationship between God, man, world and society, and his 
fight against totalitarianism and the linkage he makes between totalitarian ‘orders’ and the faith 
of Enlightenment liberalism, that defines his interest in the political and that shapes his insights.  
 It is not unfair to say that Voegelin’s reading of history may be classified as ‘declinist’: 
‘The corrosion of Western civilization through gnosticism is a slow process extending over a 
thousand years’ (Voegelin, 1952 188; see also 128) —and that he is primarily wanting to 
reestablish a lost order, one in which faith and reason may work more powerfully because they 
do not take on those monstrous qualities that accompany them when they serve more Satanic or 
Gnostic goals.  
 In some important respects, Rosenstock-Huessy can be seen as a mirror image of 
Voegelin. While, as we have said, he wants no truck with Gnosticism, his anti-transcendent view 
of Christianity is closely allied to his view of the Church as engaged in a process of anthropurgy, 
making man like God, a term and process he finds referred to in the Athanasian creed 
(Rosenstock-Huessy, 1966, 108.). Not surprisingly, Rosenstock-Huesy agrees with Voegelin 
about Joachim having ‘heralded all the social reforms and revolutions of our own millennium’.  
But, unlike Voegelin, this does not mean Rosenstock-Huessy thinks Joachim has departed from 
the Christian faith—on the contrary, he adds, ‘his conception of progress beyond the Church 
depended by implication upon the existence of the Church, and thus his position remained 
Christian’ (Rosenstock-Huessy, 1966, 75.) Like Voegelin, Rosenstock-Huessy also sees himself 
as continuing an essentially Augustinian view of politics. He too is grateful for the distinction 
between the terrestrial and heavenly cities, and the role of the Church in assisting the faithful on 
their journey to the kingdom. Yet he believes the kingdom must come, and that coming is in 
time. Eternity, for him, in any Platonic sense as simply beyond time, is a mistaken notion, which 
fails to understand that the Christian appeal is to a future kingdom that is God’s promise. 
Redemption involves redemption of God’s creation, and thus it is a redemption that can only take 
place in and through time. And this redemption has been taking place throughout the Christian 
Age. Thus Rosenstock-Huessy’s enthusiastic endorsement of Burckhardt’s assessment of the 
Greeks, which certainly highlights the tension between him and Voegelin, and also makes the 
point that the Christian faith is a process of redeeming what is valuable for humankind and that 
its mission is incarnational.  
Jacob Burckhardt never became tired of showing that Greek thinkers could not 
change the slightest little thing in antiquity. There was no superstition lacking; 
thinkers name no children. They thought of the good, the beautiful, the divine, the 
true as ideas, with the transformation through times and spaces of mankind. Only 
1500 years later, after the word again had become flesh and the four acts of 
incarnation had rolled by, thus not until the Renaissance of Greek thinkers from 
1500 to 1900 did the books of the Greek ‘thinkers’ live as forceful political 
movements. Because the word was in the position to become flesh, modern 
political forms were able to emerge out of Greek though (Rosenstock-Huessy, 
1968, 40).1 
 
 For Rosenstock-Huessy, it is not so much the search for order that leads us to look to 
history. Indeed the search for order does not really concern Rosenstock-Huessy at all; order is 
always temporary, the Holy Spirit is a moving spirit, just as God Himself announces Himself by 
being always Here one step ahead. His concern with history is with the search for love. This is 
his Augustinianism, a connection he draws explicitly near the conclusion of his Soziologie:  
 
The scores of this composition, the histories, must be paraphrased in so many 
editions as there are generations (Geschlechter) of humankind. For the 
composition is recomposed in each generation by those whose love overcomes a 
murder or a death.  
   So history becomes a great song, Augustine’s Carmen Humanum; in its every 
line, perhaps every tone, becomes a lived human life. As soon and as often as the 
lines rhyme, love has once again become stronger than death. Then from out of 
absurd contingencies, from adverse circumstances, from silent events of epoch-
making necessities, in which a lengthy ingested illness is finally confronted, 
                                                 
1 Of course Rosenstock-Huessy is well aware of the flows of Plato and Aristotle in the Christian tradition prior to the 
Renaissance—but here he is talking of their moving beyond the Church and its institutions.   
crossfertilized (eingekreuzt) and consequently overcome (Rosenstock-Huessy, 
1958, 759). 
 
 Thus, in contrast to Voegelin, whose search for order was originally conceived as an 
examination of the imperial organizations of the ancient Near East, the experiences of the 
Israelites, the polis, the Alexandrian empire, and the modern national states and their Gnostic 
underpinnings (Voegelin, 1956, x), Rosenstock-Huessy’s search for the love that overcomes 
death leads him to analyze the tribes, empires (mostly in Egypt but also in Mesopotamia, Rome 
and China), the city states, the Israelites, and Christianity as the power which is able to 
reinvigorate and reconfigure—i.e. redeem—what is still living in each of these forms of life. But 
it also led him to argue that the Church, having unified most of Europe by the end of the first 
millennium, had created the social foundations for what would become a sequence of 
revolutions, whose effects would circulate throughout Europe and eventually the world: the 
investiture conflict, or what he calls the papal revolution, the Italian Revolution (or the 
Renaissance), the German Revolution (or Reformation), the English Revolution, and even the 
French Revolution and Russian Revolutions—the anti-Christianity of the latter two coming from 
the failures of the Catholic Church in France and the Orthodox Church in Russia to adequately 
respond to the ‘cries to heaven’ of those suffering sufficiently to want to tear down their entire 
social, political, and religious order and leap into a future ostensibly free from earthly misery and 
injustice. If Rosenstock-Huessy sets himself the task of identifying the valuable effects of what 
comes ‘out of revolution’, this does not change the fact that, no less than Voegelin, Rosenstock-
Huessy sees revolutions and wars as disease (Rosenstock-Huessy, 1981, chapter 1). But, unlike 
Voegelin, he sees disease as a sometimes necessary condition which we must go through to 
achieve a fuller consciousness and activation of our powers.  
 Now whereas, as we have seen, history for Voegelin is primarily about the struggle between 
order and disorder, a struggle which, Voegelin suggests, makes it useless to speak of progress—a 
mundane concept that perverts the transcendent nature of the eschaton—for Rosenstock-Huessy 
progress is not a secular term but a Christian one, which is perverted if it is completely severed 
from its Christian roots. In a passage which simultaneously embraces what Voegelin rejects 
while also affirming much of Voegelin’s analysis, he writes:  
The idea of progress was not invented in 1789 or 1492. Jesus promised that his 
followers would do greater works than he had done (Jn. 14:12). The Church 
Fathers championed progress as the Christian view in opposition to the pagan 
belief in cycles of fate, with the golden age lying in the past; they proclaimed ‘the 
resurrection of life and love after and through suffering’, whereby God himself 
made progress in the hearts of the faithful . . . . 
   The distinctively modern idea of progress is hardly older than the eighteenth 
century, when men like Condorcet, in his Les progres de l'esprit humain, cut 
loose from the preceding centuries of religious continuity and set up a purely 
secular humanitarian ideal. The human spirit replaced the Holy Spirit. 
Emancipation from Christian traditions seemed at the time to promise unbounded 
possibilities—but the lack of guarantees for any such assumption has haunted all 
the secular philosophies of history from that day to this (Rosenstock-Huessy, 
1966, 75-76). 
 
 Progress is not automatic—indeed, ‘[b]elief in automatic progress . . . stops progress’ 
(Rosenstock-Huessy, 1966, 80). Nor does it mean, for Rosenstock-Huessy, that we may not find 
ourselves serving time in hell. On the contrary, Out of Revolution was, by Rosenstock-Huessy’s 
own account, written out of the experience of the hell of the First World War. What he means by 
progress and the steps involved are spelled out by him as follows:  
Progress, then, includes the following steps: 1. A certain level of common 
decency is accepted as ‘natural’ for some time. 2. A fall into barbarism, a 
suspension of all standards by one individual or group shocks us. Standards 
hitherto considered safe are threatened. 3. We reconsider our human state. Unable 
to understand such a deep fall, we try to delve deeper into the secret of our nature. 
We find some leak in our former conception of justice. 4. The next peace after the 
fall reflects a more complete insight into man’s true nature. It organizes us in such 
a manner that we will fall less deep next time (Rosenstock-Huessy, 1966, 82). 
 
 What Rosenstock-Huessy is saying here is that Christianity understood that man can learn 
from his ‘sins’. An important illustration of the point that Rosenstock-Huessy is making can be 
gauged from how the trauma of the Second World War carved in humanity a greater sense of the 
sinfulness of racism. Of course, this neither prevents new sins from breaking out nor new 
disasters from happening. Moreover, from Rosenstock-Huessy’s perspective, it is precisely when 
we fail to learn from our suffering that we are condemned to repeat it. He repeatedly made the 
point that the failure to find a proper peace, and the scapegoating of the Germans by the allies 
combined with the Germans’ failure to move beyond their infatuation with statism and 
nationalism, helped create the conditions for Hitler. Rosenstock-Huessy’s observation that 
‘resurrection has its severe laws. A wounded heart does not recover in the spiritual world without 
a change in the visible world’ (Rosenstock-Huessy, 1966, 145), somewhat understates precisely 
what happened when a wounded people were simply left in their injury and resentment.  
 The failure or refusal to love the neighbor is explosive. And I think the importance of the 
significance of this failure or refusal is something that plays a far greater role in Rosenstock-
Huessy’s work than in Voegelin’s. As in Augustine, evil, for Rosenstock-Huessy, is closely 
bound up with love—evil is misdirected love, failed love, and that misdirected love leaves its 
residues in the world. Societies and social forms become toxic or corrosive through the accretion 
of failed and misdirected loves. Augustine and Rosenstock-Huessy are also typically Christian in 
making self-love the common form of misdirected love. Thus a group or class which only serves 
its own interests finds itself creating toxicity around it, and eventually that toxicity will poison 
the whole social body. Revolutions and wars, when seen thus, are the consequences of love’s 
failure. To be indifferent to the sufferings of others is to create hatred of an order. In his 
diagnosis of the total revolutions of Europe, which he argues form an historically sequential set 
of solutions to the various socially imposed limitations and obstacles to our neighbourliness and 
our realization of our own inner divine likeness, Rosenstock-Huessy pauses upon how the 
traumas and wounds of the past incubate and reappear with appalling ferocity to help bring down 
a social order.  
 A good example of this is his diagnosis of the French Revolution. There he writes about 
the failure of the University of Paris to respond to the legitimate grievances of Christian 
humanists and reformers, and how, through its pride in past glories, it was locked into an earlier 
set of needs, and names, and behaviours bound up with its privileged position as the educator of 
Europe. Its complicity in the slaughter of the Huguenots would be fateful for the Catholic 
Church—though those involved in that massacre would not know that they were digging the 
grave of the Church and helping to create the non-Christian humanism that both Voegelin and 
Rosenstock-Huessy see as a modern curse. The response of the monarchy to the intransigence of 
the University of Paris was to draw the French nobility of out of les pays and the clergy far more 
closely into its political orbit, and, eventually, to abandon Paris. This was to prove politically 
disastrous for the two estates which seemed to benefit most from this maneuver. Likewise, the 
broader explosions of the religious wars (which played no small role in the English Revolution) 
and the Thirty Years’ War created the basis for modern humanism. For it was that experience 
that created a new class of intellectuals who no longer had any faith in traditional Christian 
symbols. Rosenstock-Huessy’s examination of that loss of faith and the new faiths erected by the 
philosophes in France show that he is no less critical of their blindness to the history of the 
Church than Voegelin. Nor is he less critical of the idolatrous creations of that revolution than 
Voegelin, particularly nationalism and the faith in science and art with the accompanying cult of 
the genius and novelty. The heritage of the French Revolution is all too conspicuous today in a 
world in which everybody is a member of the nation state, most have the ‘news’ as part of their 
daily diet, and look to art rather than religion for spiritual nourishment. Yet, he also sees that the 
fallout of that Revolution was not only bad—he gives particular emphasis to the granting of 
political rights to the Jews, while noting that the Dreyfus affair only revealed how precarious 
those rights were and thus how its messianism, like all political messianisms, had to come up 
against the harsh limits of its own local pressures.  
 But most importantly, while his study of revolutions is premised upon what he sees as the 
indisputable fact that the great revolutions of Europe culminate in the two World Wars (the 
Russian Revolution, for him, being a byproduct of the First World War), he is also convinced 
that these wars have forced us into ever greater potential association. The consequence of the 
sequence of total revolutions is the enforced recognition that we inhabit one world, and this is 
reinforced by administrative, technological, economic and commercial, legal and political 
systems. These are part of the globalization process, and they have their sources in the total 
revolutions and World Wars. This, for Rosenstock-Huesy, is why history is a Heilsgeschichte 
and is providential—not because of any particular goodness on the part of Western men and 
women; on the contrary, Rosenstock-Huessy’s view of man is utterly Augustinian: we are fallen 
creatures. But, to put it theologically, it is God’s providence that weaves us into a common or 
universal history. 
While Rosenstock-Huessy defends a Heilsgeschichte, at the centre of his interpretation of 
Christianity is the triadic interplay of suffering, sacrifice, and love. Christianity had discovered 
that sacrifice of the self is bound up with the recognition of death as a precondition for further 
life. Thus Christianity enters into the role of the victim, and instead of fleeing suffering is 
prepared to make of one’s suffering a sacrificial gift to the future. The typical pagan move, as the 
work of René Girard in particular has shown, is to find a victim to be the social sacrifice. Thus 
the typical pagan myth (and I think ever before Girard’s eyes is the pagan revival and practice of 
Nazism) requires a sacrifice for the restoration of peace, the end of a plague, or the cessation of a 
violent contagion. Christianity depicts this act as a failure to understand what God really wants: 
our love and the cessation of such violence. But until we realize this we endlessly repeat this 
interplay. In so far as we enable souls around us to rot and suffer our society and world are 
breeding the damage which will return as the revenge of the repressed.  
 If Voegelin’s genius was to scrutinize how modern Western men and women have locked 
themselves into a deformed symbolic order, an order which promised total freedom yet only 
intensified their spiritual despair, Rosenstock-Huessy’s was to try and show us that irrespective 
of what we believe, if we tap into the more archaic language and symbols of the Christian faith 
that formed the West, if we have but the ear to understand the speech of the Christian(ized) 
peoples of Europe,  to talk of God’s providence at work in our history is to be alert to the gifts 
that have been bestowed by the sacrificial suffering of earlier generations. It is also to say that in 
being heirs to the creations that have emerged from great suffering and sacrifice, we should not 
take the liberties and the pools of peace that we have for granted. We also need to be aware of 
the injured, wounded, and sick hearts among us, and of the dangers of squandering the peace, 
which is also the failure to work with the wounded among us. And now, as Rosenstock-Huessy 
has emphasized, the ‘us’ is planetary, is everywhere, and there are plenty of ‘us’ today whose 
rancor is as real as ‘our’ wounds, even if the Christian narrative which once expressed the faith 
and hope in love in the transcendence of that suffering has become less accessible to so any who 
dwell in the Western world.  
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